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“Anfonwch Unrhyw Waith i’w Gyfieithu”
Failblog.org is a website that collects pictures and videos that 
capture what have been deemed, in Internet vernacular, “fails.” i 
Fails include any kind of accident or mistake, and they are almost 
always funny, if only in a dark way. For example, a short preview of 
failblog.org reveals a video of a child being hit in the face with a 
soccer ball, a before-and-after ad for weight loss pills depicting a 
rather rotund “after” figure, a photo of a dictionary whose cover is 
graced by the word “dicitionary,” numerous pictures of “failboats” 
or sinking ships, an article about a Vicar who showed up to an 
emergency room with “a potato in his bottom,” and, among my 
favourites, faulty translations, such as a sign that reads “No entry 
for heavy vehicles. Residential site only” in English and “Nid wyf yn 
n swyddfa ar hyn o byrd. Anfonwch unrhyw waith i’w gyfieithu” in 
Welsh – though this apparently translates as “I am not in the office 
at the moment. Please send any work to be translated.” 
Like many words, the origins of “fail” are forgotten, concealed, 
or impossible to trace, though it may have originated in a poor 
English translation from a Japanese video game (Beam 2008: para. 
3). Taking on a life of its own, “fail” has now become an internet 
“meme.” (“Meme” refers to the notion that an idea or cultural 
phenomenon spreads like a virus through symbolic domains in 
accord with the principles of natural selection.) “Fail” can be seen 
everywhere from forums and chat rooms, celebrity gossip sites, 
online games, and even in the “non-virtual” world – for example, 
according to Beam (2008: para. 1), a protestor at the Senate 
Banking Committee’s September meeting on the proposed 
American “bailout” bill held up a sign that read “fail.” 
Three main theories of humour can explain in part why “fails” 
are so funny (see, for example, a summary by Mulder and Nijholt 
2002). The first suggests that the incongruous or the unexpected in 
Rebecca Scott 3  Poroi 6, 2, January 2010
an otherwise banal situation is funny. For example, spelling the 
word “dictionary” incorrectly on the cover of a dictionary is an 
ironic incongruence that tickles the funny bones of people 
accustomed to using these texts to check spelling. This example also 
reveals the second theory of humour, which centres on feelings of 
superiority. When someone or something “fails,” such as a spelling 
error in a dictionary, which by definition serves as an authority on 
spelling as much as meaning, our sudden sense of superiority in 
that we did not commit the fail is expressed as laughter and joy, a 
kind of schadenfreude at the missteps of another. Finally, fails can 
be understood as funny within a third theory of humour that draws 
primarily from psychoanalytic thinking. This theory suggests that 
what we find funny is an index to repression: the energy released in 
committing or witnessing taboo acts manifests itself as laughter. 
The curious Vicar is the best example from those cited above. 
A common assumption of these three theories of humour is that 
there is a latent form of politics in play in humorous situations. 
Without latent meaning, perhaps humour would not be possible. 
“Latent” here is understood itself in multiple ways as that which is 
residual or hidden, the potentiality or delay of something, and even 
(in Derridian thought) “the other” or différance. This can be 
extended from humorous situations to all forms of language, such 
that meaning is always the product of dialectical negotiations of 
competing meanings that have their origins in cultural, subcultural, 
and idiosyncratic differences. Below obvious, surface, or dominant 
understandings, latent meanings wait to bubble up. This dynamic 
process of meaning-making suggests that language is, to a certain 
degree, uncontainable and very lively.  
A central project of social scientific scholarship is to mine 
latency as a way to understand social, cultural, political, and 
psychological processes. Donna Haraway, feminist science studies 
scholar, cultural studies scholar, and much more besides, is well 
known for her work in exploring the tacit undercurrents of a diverse 
range of topics, but especially of gender, race, nature, and science. 
She is especially well known for her literary and creative use of 
language, though this is perhaps a kind characterization of 
Haraway’s writings which are notoriously difficult to read and 
frustrate readers looking for clarity or searching for her main 
“point.” In an interview, Haraway expressed the problem:
Sometimes people ask me “Why aren’t you clear?” and I always 
feel puzzled, or hurt, when that happens, thinking “God, I do the 
best I can! It’s not like I’m being deliberately unclear! I’m really 
trying to be clear!” But, you know, there is the tyranny of clarity 
and all these analyses of why clarity is politically correct. 
However, I like layered meanings, and I like to write a sentence in  
such a way that – by the time you get to the end of it – it has at 
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some level questioned itself. There are ways of blocking the 
closure of a sentence, or of a whole piece, so that it becomes hard 
to fix its meanings. I like that, and I am committed politically and 
epistemologically to stylistic work that makes it relatively harder 
to fix the bottom line. (2004: 333)
So depending on how you see it Haraway is more than a poet or 
an erudite snob. In this paper, I argue that her use of language is 
not merely a way of communicating ideas, but constitutes a 
methodology, a theory, and a praxis all at once. She obtains “data” 
by mining latency precisely because she theorizes the significance of 
undercurrents and assumptions in phenomena. Her writing itself 
performs the very latency she is keen to explore. Here language 
demonstrates its immensely generative capacity. We come to 
understand language as being “living” – perhaps it is even a 
companion species, and not merely dead “meat.” 
“Meat My Hero”
Inspired by Haraway’s writings, specifically her collection The 
Haraway Reader (2004), I will demonstrate what I mean by this 
by analyzing another funny “fail, leading to a summary and 
explication of Haraway’s work that may make its aims and effects 
more transparent. I’m trying to be very Harawayan here: the paper 
is about language, failure, humour, cowboys, hero sandwiches, 
Martin Luther King Jr., and protein.
Meat My Hero is a delightfully funny and cute fail on 
failblog.org. In current psychoanalytic thought, language represents 
the social and the cultural, and is often called the “Name of the 
Father” since mothers represent the presocial shared body of 
maternity while fathers represent a complicating factor in that 
intimate and nondistinct relationship. In order to gain access to the 
social, the child must detach itself from the maternal body and 
become a languaged being. Meat My Hero is a testament to that 
process. It captures the innocence of a child not yet sure of the 
status of meats and meetings in the world. 
But let’s try to read Meat My Hero as more than just a cute 
mistake of an innocent child or a trace of a noncultural, presocial 
space in which infants and children live. Let us take this fail as 
seriously as Haraway takes her “Teddy Bear Patriarchy” (2004: 
176). Let us mine its latent significance.
It may not be clear in this photo, but the child originally wrote 
“Martin Luther King Jr.” as his or her hero. Something, however, 
made the child change their mind. The mistake hinges, of course, 
on the ambiguous meaning of “meat/meet” when spoken. Only in 
written language or in considering context can the correct “meat/
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meet” be discerned. Yet the fail reveals, I think, much more than a 
child who does not know how to spell. That meat heroism resonated 
with the child says much about North American culture. In fact, it 
echoes a sentiment about the power of beef as expressed by the 
Cattleman’s Beef Board and the National Cattleman’s Association: 
“We know that some days it seems like you have more than enough 
on your plate. Look to the Beef” (2008a: para. 1).
Heroism, after all, is a rather ambiguous notion. In one episode 
of the favourite American primetime cartoon The Simpsons, after 
watching a news report about little Timmy O’Toole, a (later found 
to be fabricated) child who is stuck at the bottom of a well, Homer 
remarks that the hapless boy is a real hero. Daughter Lisa retorts, 
“How do you mean, Dad?” Homer replies, “Well he… fell down a 
well and can’t get out.” Lisa asks, “How does that make him a 
hero?” Annoyed, Homer shoots back, “Well it’s more than you did.” 
While perhaps heroism once suggested a strong display of moral 
excellence and courage, here we read it as nothing more than a little 
better than mediocrity, or as a newsroom gimmick deployed to take 
advantage of audience heartstrings. Meat My Hero sadly implies 
that steak, in “calming” the child, seems to do more for him/her 
than Martin Luther King Jr., suggesting thereby that American 
culture and education are in a sad state of affairs.
Or, perhaps heroism is a myth that functions hegemonically in 
this case. Willard argues that meat has a central, if often-ignored, 
role in North American culture. It is not mere sustenance: 
Our food selection is more than just a matter of preferences and 
choices; it is imbued with social meaning, cultural practice, and 
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Figure 1: Meat My Hero. Source: Failblog.org, 
http://failblog.org/2008/11/13/hero-fail/
political ideology: “[W]hen we eat, we are not merely consuming 
nutrients, we also consuming gustatory (i. e., taste-related) 
experiences, and, in a very real sense, we are also ‘consuming’ 
meanings and symbols.” (2003: 105, citing Beardsworth and Keil,  
emphasis in original) 
In other words, meat is contested, functioning symbolically in a 
number of different and contradictory ways beyond its dominant 
reading as “food.” For example, Willard suggests that meat 
consumption in the United States is closely tied to the myth of 
Manifest Destiny. In the country’s imagined past, rugged American 
cowboys and cattle ranchers were staunch individualists, both 
territorializing land with their grazing animals and creating 
sustenance to conquer and take the West (Willard 2003: 108). In 
this way, meat-eating was as much nation-building as it was food 
consumption. The erasure of “Martin Luther King Jr.” takes on a 
new meaning in this light, since, even today and within racist 
paradigms some read him a nation-destroyer by virtue of creating 
political and social upheaval. He is, once more, crossed out.
Today the myth of the heroic cowboy living out Manifest Destiny  
is expressed in the resourceful business rancher who, according to 
Willard, is portrayed as an innovative entrepreneur who is not 
afraid to use technology to get the job done… He has traded his 
John Wayne image for that of a technologically savvy 
businessman. He no longer desires to tame the West; rather he 
has a strong commitment to safe beef, research, technology, and, 
as always, old fashioned hard work. (2003: 109)
Thus we see the Cattleman’s Beef Board and the National 
Cattleman’s Beef Association characterize beef farmers as follows:
For America’s beef producers, the land is their livelihood and 
their legacy. They carefully follow science-based best 
management practices to protect our country’s natural resources 
for future generations. In fact, beef producers have led 
conservation efforts proving that raising cattle and environmental 
stewardship go hand-in-hand. (2008b: para. 2)
As this passage suggests, besides Manifest Destiny, meat 
heroism can be seen in another influential myth – for me, it’s a 
myth – the Christian Genesis creation story in the bible, in which 
Man (sic) is given “dominion” over all animals and nature as a 
“steward.” Some scholars argue that this myth has had dire 
consequences in justifying environmentally destructive practices 
such as mining, deforestation, oil drilling and the like (see Lynn 
White Jr. 1967 for a seminal critique and Merchant 1980; see 
Harrison 1999 for a rebuttal). In terms of meat production, the 
environmental costs are high, as grazing causes soil erosion, soil 
degradation, desertification, water pollution, and air pollution 
(cattle are notorious for “emitting” a potent mixture of methane 
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and gaseous ammonia) (Gossard and York 2003: 2). In this case, 
myth seems to belie “matter” – so powerful is this myth that these 
very real material consequences are of no consequence. Yet meat 
heroism is rich with matter. It is, in fact, quite meaty. 
Thus meat is a participant or “actor” in influential myths and 
cultural processes. For example, Willard (2003: 112-113) points to 
the gendered dimensions of meat consumption, in which meat-rich 
diets are associated with strength, virility, and stamina – forms of 
physical power typically associated with masculinity. Certainly, 
meat is a rich source of protein. Yet it is as if ingesting meat is like 
consuming “raw animal power.” Within this framework, heroes 
must definitely be meat-eaters. Perhaps not incidentally, “hero 
sandwiches” are an extremely popular food in North America. The 
hero sandwich (or hoagie) is a sub-style sandwich filled with cold 
cuts of meats. According to Wilton (2003: para. 8), the hero 
sandwich got its name from a journalist who thought the sandwich 
so big that only a “hero” could eat it. 
Meat My Hero? Why, it’s completely sensible.
Denaturing
Through my analysis of Meat My Hero, I have attempted to 
complicate this fail, getting at the latent meanings behind it that 
exist by virtue of politics, language and matter. A current that runs 
through Haraway’s work is this same imperative to complicate. This 
means that she is careful to both reveal complications behind 
dominant and well-established narratives, understandings, and 
ideologies, and to let those complications stand as irresolvable 
tensions. Haraway is neither solely a cultural critic nor a 
representationalist. Furthermore, she is neither a social 
constructionist nor a naïve realist in her ontology. Her work reflects 
what Karen Barad (2003) has called “onto-epistem-ology,” in which 
observing, participating, representing, and being are not separate, 
but open to each other and co-produced. 
A strong ethical thread cuts through Haraway’s work. The values 
of openness, contingency, and alterity are privileged over closure. 
There is also play. For example, in a footnote of “Teddy Bear 
Patriarchy: Taxidermy in the Garden of Eden, New York City, 
1908-1936,” Haraway writes, “It is a pleasure to compose a chapter 
in feminist theory on the subject of stuffed animals” (2004: 191). In 
this paper, she analyzes the American Natural History Museum, 
which houses taxidermic and staged animals taken from their 
habitat and killed, oddly enough, for the purpose of furthering the 
preservation and stewardship of nature. She reveals the 
contradictions and hypocrisy of this practice by linking domains 
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often considered disparate, including natural history museums and 
taxidermy, popular president Theodore Roosevelt, and a common 
child’s toy. By way of this analysis, she critiques established 
understandings not just of animals, but of life, nature, politics, 
science, masculinity, and race, as well as violence against animals, 
eugenics, and colonialism, under the rubric of what she calls “Teddy  
Bear Patriarchy” (2004: 176). Haraway writes, 
Behind every mounted animal, bronze sculpture, or photograph 
lies a profusion of objects and social interactions among people 
and other animals, which can be recomposed to tell a biography 
embracing major themes for the twentieth-century United States. 
(2004: 152)
Haraway not only critiques and deconstructs, but often 
foregrounds alternative figures that, already in their material and 
imagined constitution, are open, contingent, and irresolvable, 
including the cyborg, companion species, monsters, oncomouse, 
and the like. Amongst these figures, there are radical politics. For 
example, perhaps we can read Haraway’s “companion species” (see 
2004: 295-320) as an answer to Teddy Bear Patriarchy in terms of 
the way it envisions “animals.” Companion species emerge 
irreducibly in contacts with other species such that environments, 
cultures, histories, genomes and bodily boundaries are intimately 
shared between what we normally consider to be ontologically 
distinct species. Dogs are Haraway’s favourite example, but “rice, 
bees, tulips, and intestinal flora” also count as companion species 
for human beings because they “make life for humans what it 
is” (2004: 302). In this way, not merely the agency and will of 
humans, but the agency of nonhuman others is expressed in the 
relationship. Haraway is fond of discussing the various negotiations 
she has with her dogs on a daily basis and the ways in which they 
train her as much as she trains them. Thus the companion species 
figure rejects the anthropocentrism of Teddy Bear Patriarchy in 
which nature exists for humans to control and “preserve.” 
Companion species are co-produced to the core. 
Here those familiar with science studies will see what Haraway 
has contributed to this field. This is a field that rejects separations 
between “nature” (studied by scientists) and “culture” (or “society,” 
studied by sociologists). It is critical of the strictly social 
constructionist explanations of “natural” phenomena and the 
human-centric modes of inquiry that dominate most social 
scientific paradigms. Instead, science studies – especially the 
brands that draw on the prolific work of Bruno Latour (1987, 1988, 
1992, 1999, 2005) – holds that phenomena, agents, subjects, 
humans, nonhumans, and materials all participate in the co-
production of the world. Science is one set of practices that 
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participates in this production. It gives us some of the tools – even 
if flawed – to approach understanding what the agencies of matter 
might be. Trained as a biologist, Haraway is perhaps one of the 
best-known critics of science, pointing to the ways in which science 
could be reformulated in “feminist, multicultural, 
antiracist” (Haraway 1994: para. 6) terms. At the same time she is 
one of science’s most staunch champions within the humanities, 
forcibly pushing its productive politics to emerge. 
Yet how can such a seemingly contradictory project be done? 
Haraway’s concern for this is expressed with urgency:
How can science studies scholars take seriously the constitutively 
militarized practice of technoscience and not replicate in our own 
practice, including the material-semiotic flesh of our language, 
the worlds we analyze? How can metaphor be kept from 
collapsing into the thing-in-itself? Must technoscience – with all 
its parts, actors and actants, human and not – be described 
relentlessly as an array of interlocking agonistic fields, where 
practice is modeled as military combat, sexual domination, 
security maintenance, and market strategy? How not? (1994: 
para. 4)
Haraway’s body of work suggests that an answer to this concern lies 
in language. Language presents not merely “the master’s tools,” but 
also the tools of the master’s undoing (see 2004: 47-62). 
Haraway’s imperative to complicate is expressed in her work in 
both content and form, and as such her language is a form of 
praxis. We can examine one small example from her large body of 
work to illustrate the productive capacity of language. In “The 
Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d 
Others,” (2004: 63-124) Haraway explodes nature, technology, 
science, and culture in and through one word, “denature,” which 
carries much latent meaning. She writes, 
In the belly of the local/global monster in which I am gestating, 
often called the postmodern world, global technology appears to 
denature everything, to make everything a malleable matter of 
strategic decisions and mobile production and reproduction 
processes. Technological decontextualization is ordinary 
experience for hundreds of millions if not billions of human 
beings, as well as other organisms. I suggest that this is not a 
denaturing so much as a particular production of nature. (2004: 
65-66, emphasis in original)
On one level, “denature” can mean “de-nature,” such that 
technology is removed from nature and that those who engage and 
live with technology are in a kind of “de-” or “un-natured” state. 
This points to another understanding of “denature” which comes 
from chemistry. Denaturing is a process by which proteins, or 
amino acids, which comprise proteins, lose their structure when 
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they come into contact with strong acids, bases, or heat. To suggest 
that technology “denatures” human beings, then, suggests a prior or 
originary natural form of human beings that is deformed through 
contacts with technology. 
Haraway, of course, rejects this characterization of technology 
as a humanistic fiction of Western epistemology. Instead, through 
explorations of kinship (2004: 251-294), origin stories (2004: 
47-62), and the figure of the cyborg (2004: 7-46), she suggests that 
there is no strict ontological distinction between nature and 
technology. Such a distinction is produced and could be otherwise 
(as feminists are fond of saying). Rather, technology and nature 
enjoy a mutual and irreducible co-emergence such that technology 
is a form of nature and nature a form of technology. 
Language as a Companion Species
The multidimensionality of a single word points to the dynamism 
and generative capacity of language. Haraway reflects on a similar 
example in the notion of the cyborg: “In a way, you know, I’m doing 
this analysis of the meanings attached to the cyborg retrospectively. 
I cannot imagine that I thought all these things back in 
1983” (2004: 323). This suggests that the cyborg has latent 
significances she could not anticipate and that these significances 
changed over time. Here language has a kind of agency and is not 
merely a transparent tool for humans to use. The potential to 
change, the capacity to generate, the possession of agency – all 
these characteristics are very much starting to suggest that 
language has “life.” In science studies, the “lives” of both humans 
and nonhumans are taken seriously. We can even see this implied 
in the way Haraway describes beings: “What interested me was the 
way of conceiving of us all as communication systems, whether we 
are animate or inanimate, whether we are animals or plants, human 
beings or the planet herself, Gaia, or machines of various 
kinds” (2004: 322). If life is a communication system, then 
communication systems must have “life.” 
Perhaps it would not be too speculative, given what we have 
seen, to suggest that, in Haraway’s treatment of it, language is itself 
a kind of companion species. As noted, language variously 
cooperates with human will, seems to have its own agencies 
expressed, in particular, in latent meanings, and changes over time. 
It then becomes clear that forms of language or writing that enforce 
dominant power structures such as Teddy Bear Patriarchy assume 
the nonliving nature of language. Instead of being a companion 
species which we “meet” (see Haraway’s When Species Meet 
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(2008)), this view suggests that language is “meat.” It is there solely  
for the sustenance and support of humans. 
At minimum it is much more fun to play with living language, to 
frolic and jump and dance around with it, and enjoy a few giggles. 
At best, living language provokes, enables and performs the 
powerful and resounding critiques characteristic of Haraway’s 
work. What, then, of meat heroism? Its latency points to forms of 
violence that operate at multiple levels and through multiple sites – 
human, animal, environmental. It isn’t very companionate.
In this paper, I have tried to mime the infinite recursion in 
Haraway’s work, adopting her praxis in order to illuminate that 
praxis to illuminate her method in a way that illuminates her 
theory. In talking about language, humour, meat, and myths, I hope 
I have succeeded in helping you to understand Haraway. Since 
denaturation is a fiction of humanistic, Western science and 
epistemology, I’ve attempted to make a rather Harawayan move 
and ask, What about the proteins?
© Rebecca Scott, 2010.
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